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I. RESPONSE ARGUMENT: THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION SOUNDS IN 
CONTRACT 
A. UTAH HAS ADOPTED A PUBLIC POLICY BASED CAUSE OF ACTION 
AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE EMPLOYMENT AT WILL DOCTRINE 
SOUNDING IN TORT 
Plaintiff has fully briefed the support in Utah cases for 
the adoption of a public policy based cause of action. Brief of 
Respondent, pp. 13-14. Although Plaintiff agrees that the Court has 
not had appropriate facts before it with which to set forth the exact 
parameters of the public policy exception, there is no question but 
that the public policy based exception to the at-will employment rule 
is viable in Utah. In Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., 777 
P.2d 483 (Utah 1989) the Court simply indicated a limit to those 
parameters by stating that a majority of the Court in Berube would not 
adopt a broad public policy exception that would in essence make an 
other than "good cause" discharge actionable. Caldwell at 485 
(emphasis supplied). 
B. OTHER EXCEPTIONS TO THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL 
DOCTRINE SHOULD NOT GOVERN THE NATURE OF THE 
PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION. 
Defendants contend that since the other exceptions to the 
employment-at-will doctrine sound in contract, so should the public 
policy based exception. Petitioners' Reply Brief, pp 4-7. Plaintiff, 
however, asserts that the very nature of the public policy based 
exception distinguishes it from the other exceptions and requires that 
it be treated as a tort. 
Plaintiff recognizes that even an at-will employment is a 
contractual relationship with the at-will feature indicating the 
# 
limited nature of the contract. See Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The 
Erosion of 100 Years of Employer Privilege, 21 Idaho L.Rev. 201, 210. 
(Provides excellent historical analysis of the contract and tort 
theories of the at-will exceptions). The analysis, however, should 
center not on the relationship of the parties, but upon the conduct of Digitized by the Howard W. Hu ter Law Library, J. Reuben Cl rk Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the parties. 
This Court has recognized that tort causes of action may 
arise out of a contractual relationship. In DCR Incorporated v. Peak 
Alarm Company, 663 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1983) this Court indicated that 
"[a] party who breaches his duty of due care toward another may be 
found liable to the other in tort, even where the relationship giving 
rise to such a duty originates in a contract between the parties." 
The Court goes on further to quote the case of Tameny v. Atlantic 
Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980), a leading wrongful 
termination case based on a violation of public policy, in support of 
its position that a tort may arise out of a contractual relationship: 
[AJ wrongful act committed in the course of a contractual 
relationship may afford both tort and contractual relief, 
and in such circumstances the existence of the contractual 
relationship will not bar the injured party from pursuing 
redress in tort. 
... [I]f the cause of action arises from 
promise set forth in the contract, the 
contractu, but if it arises from the breach 
a breach of a 
action is ex 
of duty growing 
out of the contract it is ex delicto. 
... As Professor Prosser has explained: "[Whereas] 
[cjontract actions are created to protect the interest in 
having promises performed, "[t]ort actions are created to 
protect the interest in freedom from various kinds of harm. 
The duties of conduct which give rise to them are imposed by 
law, and are based primarily upon social policy, and not 
necessarily upon the will or intention of the parties...." 
Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) p. 613. [Emphasis 
added; some bracketed language in original] 
. i 
Peak Alarm, 663 P.2d at 435 (some citations omitted). 
In the implied or express contract, or good faith and fair 
dealing exceptions, the exceptions help to define the expectations of 
the parties in performing the employment agreement. If an employee 
has the benefit of a manual or rules promulgated by the employer, he 
has a right to expect that if he follows them, that the employer will 
do likewise. Further, if he enters into an agreement he has the right 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to expect that the other party will act in good faith and fairly in 
carrying out the covenants of the agreement. This is seen in the 
first party insurance contract as is set forth by Defendants in their 
Reply Brief, pp 11 and 12. 
Unlike the other two exceptions, however, the public policy 
violation arises out of a duty imposed by law, independent of the 
employment agreement, the violation of which is unexpected when the 
agreement is entered into. In Malone v. University of Kansas Medical 
Center, 220 Kan. 371, 374, 552 P.2d 385, 888 (1976), the Kansas 
Supreme Court stated: 
A breach of contract may be said to be a material failure of 
performance of a duty arising under or imposed by agreement. 
A tort, on the other hand, is a violation of a duty imposed 
by law, a wrong independent of contract. Torts can, of 
course, be committed by parties to a contract. The question 
to be determined here is whether the actions or omissions 
complained of constitute a violation of duties imposed by 
law, or of duties arising by virtue of the alleged express 
agreement between the parties. 
Cited by Mauk, 21 Idaho L.Rev. at 209. In the public policy violation 
it is clear that the public policy of the state, not the employment 
agreement, gives rise to duties imposed by law. The contractual 
employment is involved merely because it forms the basis of the 
relationship. 
Contrary to Petitioners' position (Reply Brief, p. 6) the 
goal of the public policy exception is not just to establish certain 
circumstances under which the employment relationship cannot be 
terminated. The goal is to uphold the public policy of the state. It 
is to protect those employees who stand against their employers when 
the employer's desires do not reflect what is in the public good. It 
is to deter employers from using their unique position over an 
employee to coerce conduct against the public good. Finally, it is to 
encourage employees to engage in lawful conduct that is in the public Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
good. These same concerns are not present in the other at-will 
exceptions because those exceptions deal with the parties1 
expectations only, not in deterrence or promotion of that which is in 
the public good. 
There must be a strong deterrent to keep employers from 
coercing employees to engage in conduct that violates the substantial 
public policy of the state. Otherwise, a cost benefit analysis, often 
employed to determine the feasibility of a contract, may be employed. 
If the employer believes that it can coerce violations of public 
policy and 1) the chances of getting caught are slim because 
employees cannot take the chance of losing their jobs; and 2) if they 
are caught, their damages will be minimized by placing the employee 
where he was but for the breach, an employer may well take its 
chances in violating public policy through its employees. This does 
nothing to protect employees who stand and uphold the state's public 
policy, and encourages violations that are in the employer's (but not 
the public's) interest. Recognizing a public policy based cause of 
action for wrongful discharge that has the deterrent effect of tort 
damages will not only deter employers from improper conduct against 
the public good, but will also promote obedience to the public policy 
of the state by employees who otherwise have a very strong incentive 
(to keep their job) to violate them. 
This is simply not analogous to the first party insurance 
context as is argued by Defendants at pages 11 and 12 of their Reply 
Brief. In the insurance context it is difficult to imagine an 
instance where the insurer would hold the power over the insured 
sufficient to compel an insured to actively take steps that were 
against the public good but in the insurer's best interest. In the 
employment context, however, employers commonly have coercive powers 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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over an employee. 
Justice Zimmerman's concurring opinion in Berube v. Fashion 
Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) suggests that he would imply 
at law a covenant in every employment contract that an employee cannot 
be terminated in a manner that contravenes the public policy of the 
State. Id. at 1051 If the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is 
recognized in the employment area, as it has in all other contractual 
relationships, a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
would occur where someone is discharged in violation of the state's 
public policy. If the public policy exception is read as narrowly as 
Justice Zimmerman proposes, it will be swallowed up and be of no use 
or effect, despite the fact that the public policy exception is the 
most widely recognized exception to the employment at will doctrine, 
and arguably has the most compelling reasons for its application. 
Employees who seek to act in accordance with the state's public policy 
would not be protected from losing their jobs for refusing to act 
against the public policy of the state, and employers who coerce 
employees to engage in the conduct against the public good and in the 
employer's self interest, would not be deterred. 
C. EMPLOYERS ARE OR SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE 
SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICIES OF THE STATE AND 
SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISED TO FIND THEMSELVES 
ANSWERING IN DAMAGES FOR VIOLATIONS 
Defendants argue that the public policy exception should not 
be a tort because it is too difficult to define and that they have 
inadequate notice of what is expected of them. Defendants' Reply 
Brief, pp 7-10. 
An employer would have a difficult time arguing that it was 
unaware of the public policy of the state, or that willful and 
malicious violations of that public policy may lead to damages. It 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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may be unhappy to find that its cost/benefit analysis under a contract 
theory did not actually limit its damages, but it cannot argue that it 
was not on notice. The real test to determine whether punitive 
damages should be awarded should be whether the employer had any means 
of appreciating that its conduct was wrongful. See Mallor, Punitive 
Damages for Wrongful Discharge, 26 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 449, 483 
(excellent discussion on need for punitive damages to deter employers 
in wrongful dismissal actions). Mallor continues with this analysis: 
A Court also might find that the employer had notice that a 
given discharge would be wrongful when the discharge 
interferes with a well-known and clearly established 
personal right or public interest. A Defendant who knows or 
has good reason to know of an established right held by 
Plaintiff (such as the right to claim worker's compensation 
benefits for on-the-job injuries) might expect that 
interference with that right is wrongful, regardless of 
whether a Court of that jurisdiction has expressly held it 
to constitute a tort. 
Id. Defendants would have the cause of action sound in contract to 
avoid the imposition of punitive damages. This Court must not limit 
the availability of a necessary tort because of the damages that may 
be imposed when the punitive damages themselves have a built in 
mechanism to protect against abuse. See Behrens v. Raleigh Hills 
Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983) (Punitive damages 
require "proof of willful and malicious conduct, or...proof of conduct 
which manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward and 
disregard of, the rights of others, especially where compensatory 
damages may be simply absorbed as a cost of business). 
D. CONTRACT AND OTHER TORT REMEDIES ARE INSUFFICIENT 
TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF THE PUBLIC POLICY 
EXCEPTION 
Plaintiff agrees that the purpose of punitive damages is to 
punish and deter conduct that is not likely to be deterred by other 
means. Petitioners' Reply Brief, pp. 10-11. This, however, supports 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the need for the public policy cause of action to be a tort. 
Without the possibility of punitive damages, employers are 
not likely to be deterred from conduct that is not only harmful to the 
employee but to the public good. The Illinois Supreme Court in Kelsay 
v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353 (111. 1979) stated M[t]he imposition 
on the employer of that small additional obligation to pay a 
wrongfully discharged employee compensation would do little to 
discourage the practice of retaliatory discharge, which mocks the 
public policy of this State...." Kelsay at 359. See also Mallor, 26 
Win and Mary L. Rev. at 480. Our Court in Behrens v. Raleigh Hills 
Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d at 1187, indicated that punitive damages may 
be appropriate to take the profit out of wrongdoing where 
compensatory damages are small in relation to the financial 
resources of a defendant and can be subsumed as a cost of 
doing business. The intended deterrent effect must be clear 
and in proportion to the nature of the wrong and the 
possibility of recurrence. 
Punitive damages, and therefore a tort cause of action, must be 
available for use in appropriate cases to deter employers from willful 
and malicious violations of public policy. For a good discussion on 
the need to encourage employees to uphold public policy without the 
threat of retaliation, see M, Glazer & P. Glazer, The Whistleblowers: 
Exposing Corruption in Government and Industry, (Basic Books, 1989). 
Contract remedies are insufficient. This Court has 
recognized that in unusual cases, damages for mental anguish might be 
provable. Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 802 
(Utah, 1985). Not only does this water down any deterrent effect that 
the public policy exception may have, but it also does nothing to 
compensate for the wrong to society, and gives well intentioned 
employees little incentive or protection in standing up against the 
employer where public policy is violated. In Vermillion v. AAA Pro 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-8-
Moving & Storage, 704 P.2d 1360 (Ariz.App. 1985) the employee was 
ordered to conceal a theft. The employee notified the customer that 
his employer had stolen salvaged property, and he was fired. If only 
contract damages would have been available to him, the deterrent 
effect on the employer from doing this in the future would likely be 
minimal, i.e. lost wages. The mental anguish suffered by the employee 
may not rise to the level of "unusual" which would allow him to be 
compensated for his damages. The "outrageous" wrong was directed at 
society, the employee without whom the incident would not have been 
brought to light, is left having to find new employment and the 
employer left with little deterrent effect from hiring another 
employee whose circumstances are such that they cannot afford to lose 
their job and will cooperate in his illegal scheme. Contract damages, 
even under Beck would be insufficient to promote the public policy of 
this state and provide employees with needed protection from employers 
who are looking out only for their own self interest. 
Finally, no other tortious cause of action covers the 
standard wrongful termination in violation of public policy. The 
closest tort is arguably intentional infliction of emotional distress 
Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2nd 289, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961). This tort, 
however, requires intentional or reckless, extreme and outrageous 
conduct toward Plaintiff, causing severe emotional distress. Many 
public policy based wrongful termination actions arise because the 
employer has violated some tenet of public policy directed at society. 
An employee deserving of the protection of the cause of action may be 
left with no cause of action because the intentional and outrageous 
conduct was not directed at him. In the Vermillion case cited supra, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the conduct of the employer was outrageous and something society 
should not tolerate, but it was not intentionally directed at the 
employee: his termination was simply a by-product of the employer's 
illegal scheme. A public policy based cause of action for wrongful 
termination must be present to promote the public policy of this state 
by employees and employers and to deter employers from acting with 
impunity to do what is in their self interest despite what is in the 
public interest. 
E. UTAH SHOULD FOLLOW THE MAJORITY OF THE STATES IN 
UPHOLDING A TORT CAUSE OF ACTION 
As has been argued above, the public policy exception is 
distinguishable from the other at-will exceptions and it would not be 
inconsistent for Utah to find the public policy exception is a tort. 
The strong majority of the states have found that the public policy 
based wrongful termination cause of action sounds in tort. 1/ 
1/ Petitioners attack several cases in Respondent's Addendum VII, 
through a footnote at pages 12 and 13 of their Reply Brief. The 
specific states challenged by Petitioners are responded to below. 
Not only has one more state, Ohio, joined the vast majority finding 
the public policy exception to be a tort, but those called into 
question by Defendants are firmly within the tort action. Attached as 
an Addendum to this Brief is a corrected state by state listing of how 
the states have treated the issue now before this court for 
consideration. 
Connecticut--After referring to cases from several states which had 
found public policy based causes of action sounding in tort, the 
Supreme Court stated "In light of these recent cases, which evidence a 
growing judicial receptivity to the recognition of a tort claim for 
wrongful discharge, the trial court was in error in granting the 
defendant's motion to strike. ...For today, it is enough to decide 
that an employee should not be put to an election whether to risk 
criminal sanction or to jeopardize his continued employment." Sheets 
v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 389. Also see the tort 
analysis of Sheets in Guidelines for a Public Exception to the 
Employment at Will Rule: The Wrongful Discharge Tort, 13 Conn. ET 
Rev. 617. 
Maryland — Kessler v. Equity Management, Inc., 572 A.2d 1144 (Md.App. 
1990) clarifies any prior ambiguity and here analyzes punitive damages 
for "a tort arising out of a contract." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Additionally, a majority of the states have determined that the other 
at-will exceptions sound in contract. In the recent case of Noye v. 
Hoffmana-La Roche, Inc., 570 A.2d 12 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1990) that 
court analyzed the differences between the public policy and good 
faith/fair dealing exceptions and held, as we urge here, that the 
public policy based claim is in tort even though the other at-will 
exceptions sound in contract. It cites a majority of states that have 
done likewise. Id. at 14, 15. 
It is instructive to look to our sister state of Arizona 
which has analyzed this area more thoroughly than most. See Addendum 
for cases. 
CONCLUSION: The public policy based exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrine should sound in tort, following the strong 
majority of states in our country. It is distinguishable in the 
manner in which it arises and the interests it seeks to protect, and 
should be treated differently than the other at-will exceptions. Such 
treatment would be totally consistent with the case law of our state, 
and would bring Utah into the majority of states that so hold. 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
Montana--Nye v. Department of Livestock, 639 P.2d 503 (1982) indicates 
"The District Court's order of dismissal appears to rest upon the fact 
that Nye's employment was 'at will.' However, the tort of wrongful 
discharge may apply to an at will employment situation." Iji. at 501-
502. For a thorough analysis of the Montana cases clearly setting 
forth their tort basis for both the public policy and good faith and 
fair dealing exceptions, see Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment 
Termination, 66 N.C. Law R. 631, 663-670 (1980). 
North Carolina-- The language relied upon in Sides v. Duke Hospital, 
328 S.B.2d 818 (N.C. App. 1985) was "[P]laintiff's plea for punitive 
damages in the claims for wrongful discharge and malicious 
interference with contract was appropriate, since both claims sound in 
tort.... Id. at 830 (emphasis supplied). 
Texas--HcClendon v. Ingersol-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69 (1989), refers to 
the good faith and fair dealing action as a tort, see ftnt 1, and in 
ftnt 3, and without correcting him, acknowledges that the Plaintiff 
was, under the public policy exception, seeking damages for mental 
anguish and punitive damages. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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DATED this_^T daY o f April, 1991 
fc( 
DAVID BERT HAVAS of HICHELLE E. HEWARD of 
DAVID BERT HAVAS AND ASSOC. DAVID BERT HAVAS AND ASSOC, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Of the 40 states that have recognized a cause of action 
for a violation of public policy, 32 recognize the action as a 
tort, 3 as a contract, and in 5 states it is unclear. 
The following states have expressly or impliedly 
recognized a wrongful termination or retaliatory discharge claim 
as a result of public policy violations, based in tort: 
ARIZONA, Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 710 P.2d 
1025, 1036 (1985) (termination for refusal to commit act which 
might constitute indecent exposure), Wagner v. City of Globe, 722 
P.2d 250 (1986) (good discussion re recognizing exceptions to at-
will rule); 
CALIFORNIA, Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1331 
(1980); 
COLORADO, Cronk v. Intermountain Rural Electric Assn, 765 P.2d 
619, 622 (Ct.App. 1988) (employee discharged for exercising a 
specifically enacted right or duty), Winther v. DEC 
International, Inc., 625 F.Supp 100, 104 (D.Colo. 1985) (applying 
Colorado law, cause of action is a tort); 
CONNECTICUT, Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 
335, 388-89 (1980) (termination for insisting employer comply 
with food and drug laws); 
HAWAII, Parnar v. American Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631 (1982) 
(fired oecause testimony Derore reaeral grand jury might be 
damaging to employer); 
ILLINOIS, Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 877 
(1981) (termination for giving information to police in criminal 
investigation); 
INDIANA, Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 
(1973) (termination for filing worker's compensation claim), 
Scott v. Union Tank Car, 402 N.E.2d 992 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) 
(wrongful discharge action is a tort); 
IOWA, Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co., Inc., 429 N.W.2d 558, 560 
(1988) (termination for filing worker's compensation claim); 
KANSAS, Murphy v. City of Topeka, 630 P.2d 186, 193 (Kan. App. 
1981) (retaliatory discharge); 
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KENTUCKY, Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730, 733 
(1984) (violation of fundamental and well defined public policy); 
MARYLAND, Kessler v. Equity Management, Inc., 572 A.2d 1144 
(Md.App. 1990) (termination for refusing to violate tenants' 
constitutional right to privacy by carrying out illegal entries 
to their property and searches of their belongings; Kern v. South 
Baltimore General Hospital, 504 A.2d 1154 (Ct.App. 1986) 
(recognizes public policy based cause of action, but not in facts 
of this case), Alder v. American Standard Corp., 538 F.Supp. 572, 
579 5c 580 (D. Md. 1982) (good discussion re federal law as source 
of public policy); 
MINNESOTA, Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588, 
592 (Ct.App. 1986) (violation of federal law basis for public 
policy); 
MISSOURI, Boyle v. Vista Eyeware, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 878 
(Ct.App. 1985) (federal law FDA regulations were basis for public 
policy); 
MONTANA, Nye v, Dept. of Livestock, 638 P.2d 498, 502 (1982) (But 
1987 legislation requires employer to discharge only for good 
cause and not in retaliation for refusing to do an act violative 
of public policy or in violation of personnel policy); 
NEVADA, Hanson v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394, 396 (1984) 
(termination for filing worker's compensation claim); 
NEW HAMPSHIRE, Cloutier v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 436 
A.2d 1140, 1143, 1146 (1981) (refers to prior cases as 
establishing tort based cause of action for violation of public 
policy); 
NEW JERSEY, Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 
512 (1980) see also Cerracchio v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 538 A.2d 
1292 (1988) (tort and contract remedies available); 
NEW MEXICO, Chavez v. Manville Products Corp., 777 P.2d 371 
(1989) (Retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy is an 
intentional tort); see also Vigil v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613, 619 
(Ct.App. 1983) (revised on other grounds); 
NORTH CAROLINA, Sides v. Duke Hospital, 328 S.E.2d 818, 830 (App. 
1985), rev, denied, 333 S.E.2d 490 (1985) (terminated for refusal 
to testify untruthfully in Court), see also Coman v. Thomas Mfg. 
Co., 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989) (Supreme Ct. upholds Sides reasoning); 
NORTH DAKOTA, Krein v. Morian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793, 
795 (1987) (termination for filing worker's compensation claim); 
OHIO, Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 551 
N.E.2d 981 (1990) (termination for implementing child support 
wage withholding order), see also Shaffer v. Frontrunner, Inc., 
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566 N.E.2d 193 (1990) (two plaintiffs, one fired for attending 
jury duty and the other in retaliation for daughter attending 
jury duty) 
OKLAHOMA, Burk v. K-Mart Corp. , 770 P.2D 24, 28 (1989) (violation 
of public policy set in constitution, statutes or case law gives 
rise to tort); 
OREGON, Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l, Inc., 681 P.2d 114, 116 
(1984) (terminated for refusal to sign potentially defamatory 
statement); 
PENNSYLVANIA, Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119 
(1978) (terminated for jury duty), Veno v. Meredith, 515 A.2d 
571, 577 (1986) (public policy violation gives rise to a tort); 
RHODE ISLAND, Cummins v. EG & G Sealol, Inc., 690 F.Supp 134 
(D.R.I. 1988) (Concludes Rhode Island would recognize public 
policy based cause of action citing Volino v. General Dynamics, 
539 A.2d 531 (1988)); 
SO. CAROLINA, Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 337 
S.E.2d 213, 216 (1985) (terminated for honoring subpoena to grand 
jury investigation); 
TENNESSEE, Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441, 444-45 
(1984); 
TEXAS, Sabine v. Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 
(1985) (discharged for refusing to perform illegal act), 
McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69, (1989) (Court 
acknowledges damages for mental anguish and punitive damages); 
VIRGINIA, Bowman v. State Bank of Keysviile, 331 S.E.2d 797, 801 
(1985), Haigh v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America, 676 F.Supp 
1332 (E.D. Va. 1987) (discusses and applies Va. law); 
WASHINGTON, Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 
(1984) (termination for complying with law); 
WEST VIRGINIA, Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 289 S.E.2d 692, 701 
(1982) (refusal to violate consumer protection laws); 
WYOMING, Griess v. Consolidated Freightways, 776 P.2d 752, 754 
(1989) (terminated for filing worker's compensation claim). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Of those states recognizing a public policy exception, 
the following states provide contract remedies for such cause of 
action: 
ALASKA, Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 
(1939) (violations of public policy considered breaches of 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, implies 
contractual remedies); 
ARKANSAS, Sterling Drug, Inc v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380 (1988), 
reh den. 747 S.W.2d 579 (1988) (public policy violations 
predicated on breach of implied provision not to discharge for an 
act done in public interest); 
WISCONSIN, Brockmeyer v. Dun 6c Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983). 
In the following states Plaintiff has been unable to 
ascertain whether the recognized public policy based cause of 
action sounds in tort or contract: 
IDAHO, Staggier v. Idaho Falls Consolidated Hospitals, Inc., 715 
P.2d 1019 (Ct.App. 1986); 
MASSACHUSETTS, Hobson v. McLean Hospital Corp. 522 N.E.2d 975, 
978-979 ftnt. 3 (Sup.Jud.Ct. 1988), DeRose v. Putnam Mgmt. Co., 
496 N.E.2d 428 (1986) (good discussion re measure of damages tort 
no holding); 
MICHIGAN, Goins v. Ford Motor Co., 347 N.W.2d 184, 191 (Ct. App. 
1983) (termination for filing worker's compensation claim against 
employer) although a separate panel of the Court of Appeals ruled 
in a 1988 case that termination in retaliation for filing a 
worker's compensation claim sounds in contract, not tort. See 
Lopas v. L & L Shop-Rite, Inc., 430 N.W.2d 757 (1988); BUT SEE: 
Pratt v. Brown Machine Co., 3 IER Cases 1121, 1134 (6th Cir. 
1988) (interpreting Michigan law upholds tort cause of action, 
but recognizes split in Michigan Court of Appeals); 
NEBRASKA, Ambroz v. Cornhuskers Square, Ltd., 416 N.W.2d 510 
(1987), Schriner v. Meginnis Ford Co., 421 N.W.2d 755 (1988); 
VERMONT,
 mPayne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586, 589 (1986); 
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The following states have not adopted a public policy 
exception to at-will rule: 
ALABAMA, Reich v. Holiday Inn, 454 S.2d 
present justification to modify at-will 
v. Signal Delivery Service, Inc., 548 F.S 
(held Arkansas would recognize exception 
DELAWARE; 
FLORIDA, Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional Administrators, 
427 S.2d 182 (1983) (but statutes already prohibit employer 
retaliation for voting, jury service, whistle blowing and filing 
worker's compensation claims); 
GEORGIA; 
LOUISIANA, Gil v. Metal Service Corp., 412 S.2d 706 (Ct.App. 
1982); 
MAINE; 
MISSISSIPPI, Laws v. Aetna Finance Co., 667 F.Supp. 342, 348 
(D.N. Miss. 1987) (Mississippi would adopt public policy 
exception to at-will rule); 
NEW YORK, Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 
(N.Y.App. 1983); 
SOUTH DAKOTA, Abrogated employment at-will by statute; 
982 (1984) (case did not 
rule), but see Scholtes 
upp. 487 (W.D.Ark. 1932) 
to at-will rule); 
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